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Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions

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Santiago S?chez-Pag? ()

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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 547.02.

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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:547.02

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition formation; exclusion contest; tragedy of the commons;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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  1. Meinhardt, Holger, 1999. " Common Pool Games Are Convex Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 247-70. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. A. Muthoo, 2002. "A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights," Economics Discussion Papers 546, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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