Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 547.02.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Coalition formation; exclusion contest; tragedy of the commons;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-11-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-COM-2002-11-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-POL-2002-11-10 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- A. Muthoo, 2002.
"A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights,"
Economics Discussion Papers
546, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Meinhardt, Holger, 1999. " Common Pool Games Are Convex Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 247-70.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 2000.
"The Creation of Effective Property Rights,"
NBER Working Papers
7897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
- Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September.
- Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Endogenous group formation in experimental contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 419, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Endogenous group formation in experimental contests," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-301, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Guofu Tan & Ruqu Wang, 2010. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 273-299, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.