Military competition and size and composition of economy and government
AbstractThis paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of military competition between states on the size and composition of the economy and the government. Great economies of scale in warfare and even distributions of military capability among the contestants generate intense interstate rivalry, strong concern for relative economic and military capability. Consequently, there is a larger economy and government and an increasing share of the military in the economy. However, if there are diseconomies of scale in the provision of public intermediate inputs, intense military competition between states actually increases the relative size of the civilian public sector relative to that of the military. The paper then studies how waves of military technological revolutions affected military competition between states and the size and composition of economy and government in history.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37968.
Date of creation: 05 Jan 2012
Date of revision: 05 Apr 2012
Growth of Government; Public Intermediate Inputs; Civilianization; Economic Performance; Military Technological Revolutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 2005.
"War, peace, and the size of countries,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1333-1354, July.
- Spolaore, Enrico & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "War, Peace, and the Size of Countries," Scholarly Articles 4553002, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina, 2001. "War, Peace and the Size of Countries," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1937, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jones, E L, 1974. "Institutional Determinism and the Rise of the Western World," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(1), pages 114-24, March.
- Bird, Richard M, 1971. "Wagner's o Law' of Expanding State Activity," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 26(1), pages 1-26.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Dudley, L., 1989.
"Punishment, Reward And The Fortunes Of States,"
Cahiers de recherche
8902, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Albert Breton, 1989. "The Growth of Competitive Governments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 717-50, November.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
- Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 485-507, June.
- Herschel Grossman, 2000.
"The Creation of Effective Property Rights,"
2000-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
- Dudley, Leonard, 1990. "Structural change in interdependent bureaucracies: Was Rome's failure economic or military?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 232-248, April.
- Grossman, Herschel I., 2002.
""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1997. ""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State," NBER Working Papers 6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- West, Edwin G., 1991. "Secular cost changes and the size of government : Towards a generalized theory," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 363-381, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.