IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i11p2431-2457.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Bos, Dieter
  • Kolmar, Martin

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of individuals. Hence, we depart from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interpret it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. The second purpose of the paper is to develop a theory of institutions that implement optimal allocations. We depart from the assumption of an exogenous enforcement of constitutional rules. Hence, the self-enforcement of constitutional rules is crucial for the implementability of allocations. This approach implies that there is no allocative difference between constitutional and ordinary rules. What makes constitutions different from ordinary rules is their potential ability to create a focal point that conditions the expectations of individuals on a certain equilibrium strategy. Hence, constitutions help to solve coordination problems, not cooperation problems.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:11:p:2431-2457
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(02)00048-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Körber, Achim & Kolmar, Martin, 1996. "To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests," Discussion Papers, Series II 301, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 2002. "Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(3), pages 393-407, September.
    5. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May.
    6. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    8. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-294, March.
    9. Ostrom, Elinor, 2009. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 89-110, December.
    10. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    11. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1991. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Directly Unproductive Activities," Papers 12-91-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    12. Bös, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2000. "Anarchy, Efficiency and Redistribution," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 10/2000, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    13. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
    14. Anderson, James E. & Marcouiller, S.J. Douglas, 1997. "Trade and Security, I: Anarchy," Working Paper Series 477, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    15. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 9986, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    16. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    17. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    18. Hartmut Kliemt, 1993. "On justifying a minimum welfare state," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-172, March.
    19. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    20. Grossman, Herschel I., 1995. "Robin hood and the redistribution of property income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-410, September.
    21. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    22. Hans Gersbach, 2004. "Fiscal Constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 3-25, March.
    23. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    24. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    25. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-117, February.
    26. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May.
    27. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 8749, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    28. Karl Wärneryd, 1993. "Anarchy, Uncertainty, And The Emergence Of Property Rights," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 1-14, March.
    29. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    30. Korber, Achim & Kolmar, Martin, 1996. "To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(3-4), pages 381-392, September.
    31. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434-434.
    32. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    33. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    34. Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634.
    35. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    36. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    37. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
    38. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
    39. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March.
    40. Herschel I. Grossman & Minseong Kim, 1996. "Inequality, Predation and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 5704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    41. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bos, Dieter & Kolmar, Martin, 2003. "Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2431-2457, October.
    2. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    3. Anna Balestra & Raul Caruso, 2023. "Vaccines between war and market," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 24-39, March.
    4. Konstantin Chatziathanasiou & Svenja Hippel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2020. "Property, Redistribution, and the Status Quo," Munich Papers in Political Economy 02, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    5. J. Amegashie, 2008. "Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 685-699, May.
    6. Dieter Bös, 2004. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 359-380, June.
    7. Konstantin Chatziathanasiou & Svenja Hippel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2021. "Property, redistribution, and the status quo: a laboratory study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 919-951, September.
    8. Anna Rubinchik & Roberto Samaniego, 2013. "Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 73-97, June.
    9. Raul Caruso & Jon Echevarria-Coco, 2023. "International prices and continuing conflict: Theory and evidence from sub-Saharan Africa (1980–2017)," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(6), pages 889-905, November.
    10. Caruso Raul, 2011. "On the Nature of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-13, January.
    11. Feige, Christian & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2015. "Voting and transfer payments in a threshold public goods game," Working Paper Series in Economics 73, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    12. Bergh, Andreas, 2008. "A critical note on the theory of inequity aversion," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1789-1796, October.
    13. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    2. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
    3. Kolmar, Martin, 2005. "The contribution of Herschel I. Grossman to political economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 802-814, December.
    4. Konstantin Chatziathanasiou & Svenja Hippel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2020. "Property, Redistribution, and the Status Quo," Munich Papers in Political Economy 02, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    5. Martin Kolmar, 2008. "Perfectly Secure Property Rights and Production Inefficiencies in Tullock Contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(2), pages 441-456, August.
    6. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2013. "Restricted Coasean bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 296-307.
    7. Konstantin Chatziathanasiou & Svenja Hippel & Michael Kurschilgen, 2021. "Property, redistribution, and the status quo: a laboratory study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 919-951, September.
    8. Pelosse, Yohan, 2009. "Mediated Contests and Strategic Foundations for Contest Success Functions," MPRA Paper 18664, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Global threats and the domestic struggle for power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 495-508, June.
    10. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
    11. Hadi Yektaş & Magnus Hoffmann & Friedhelm Hentschel & Roland Hodler, 2019. "Wars of Conquest and Independence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(4), pages 617-640.
    12. Martin Kolmar, 2007. "Goods or resource contests?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 491-499, June.
    13. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
    14. Eggert, Wolfgang & Kolmar, Martin, 2006. "Contests with size effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 989-1008, December.
    15. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2017. "Endogenous Destruction In Conflict: Theory And Extensions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 479-500, January.
    16. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 9986, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    17. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Contested water rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 247-260, June.
    18. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1998. "Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 685-701, November.
    19. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2020. "Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 891-927.
    20. Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Military competition and size and composition of economy and government," MPRA Paper 37968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2012.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:11:p:2431-2457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.