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On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players

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  • Abhinay Muthoo

    (University of Essex)

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0471.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0471

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  1. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0471, Econometric Society.
  2. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
  3. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
  4. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-73, October.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 99-00-12, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  8. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
  9. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  10. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
  11. Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  12. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  13. Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "Investment, property rights and political instability: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1317-1341, July.
  14. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  15. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  16. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998. "Law, Finance, and Firm Growth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 2107-2137, December.
  17. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  18. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 1999. "Property Rights, Finance, and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series 212, CESifo Group Munich.
  19. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, 07.
  2. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0471, Econometric Society.

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