Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 8 (1974)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 401-412
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:8:y:1974:i:4:p:401-412

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Dieter Boes & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Anarchy, Efficiency, and Redistribution," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
2. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Herschel Grossman, 2000. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," Working Papers 2000-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   • Herschel I. Grossman, 2000. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 7897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jack Hirshleifer, 1990. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 597, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Jack Hirshleifer, 1992. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," UCLA Economics Working Papers 674, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Hoffmann, Magnus, 2006. "Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy," MPRA Paper 3260, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Alex Coram, 2006. "An asymmetric dynamic struggle between pirates and producers," Working Papers 2006-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Dieter Bös & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Anarchy, Efficiency and Redistribution," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2000, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
8. Santiago S?chez-Pag?, . "Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 547.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2002. "Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions," Grand Coalition 42, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
9. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the Foundations of Basic Property Rights, Part I: A Model of the State-of-Nature with Two Players," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0471, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "On the foundations of basic property rights, Part I: A model of the state-of-nature with two players," Economics Discussion Papers 512, University of Essex, Department of Economics.

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-25.