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Conflict and the Social Contract

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  • Helmut Bester
  • Karl Wärneryd

Abstract

We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2006 .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 108 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
Pages: 231-249

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:108:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
  2. Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "On The Economics oF Organized Crime," Working Papers 070815, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  3. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," Working Papers 080922, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  4. Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "An economic approach to analyzing civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
  5. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
  6. repec:cge:warwcg:66 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-55, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  8. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Working Papers 060705, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Tangerås, Thomas, 2008. "Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict," Working Paper Series 751, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  10. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
  11. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
    [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O
    ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.

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