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Insecure Properties and the Stability of Exchange

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Author Info
Skaperdas, S.
Syropoulos, C.

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Abstract

Existing work on the costs of insecure property has largely focused on the overexploitation problem of common pool resources. We investigate other costs of insecure resources - uncertainty costs, the absence of exchange, and enforcement costs - within a simple general equilibrium setting.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 95-96-8.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:95-96-8

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; BARGAINING; CONTRACTS; UNCERTAINTY; GAMES;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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  1. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1997. "Anarchy and Autarky: Endogenous Predation as a Barrier to Trade," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 383, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Oct 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James E. Anderson, 1999. "Why Do Nations Trade (So Little)?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 428, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 1997. "Trade and Security,I: Anarchy," NBER Working Papers 6223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Helmut Bester & Karl Warneryd, . "Conflict Resolution under Asymmetric Information," Papers 006, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Papers 94, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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