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Anarchy and Autarky: Endogenous Predation as a Barrier to Trade

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Author Info
James E. Anderson () (Boston College)
Douglas Marcouiller, S.J. () (Boston College)

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Abstract

Market exchange is subject to an endogenously determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. We construct a model in which utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge: autarky (with no predation and no defense), insecure exchange equilibria (with predation and defense), and secure exchange equilibria (in which defense completely deters predation). Trading equilibria, two-thirds of them secure, are supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Since changes in the technologies of defense and predation have terms of trade effects, some producers may be hurt by enhanced security. We show cases of 'immiserizing security' in which producers in large poor countries are harmed by increased security.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP383.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 383.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 1997
Date of revision: 01 Oct 2001
Publication status: published in International Economic Review, 46, 189213, 2005.
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:383

Note: This paper was previously circulated as "Trade and Security, I: Anarchy".
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Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
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Related research
Keywords: insecure trade; predation; transactions costs;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hummels, David, 2001. "Time as a Trade Barrier," GTAP Working Papers 1152, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rauch, James E., 1999. "Networks versus markets in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 7-35, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 177-186, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Trefler, Daniel, 1995. "The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1029-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1996. "Insecure Properties and the Stability of Exchange," Papers 95-96-8, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  8. James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 1999. "Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 7189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James E. Anderson, 2008. "Commercial Policy in a Predatory World," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 703, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2009. "International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined," Working Papers 080921, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. James E. Anderson, 2005. "Economic Integration and the Civilizing Commerce Hypothesis," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 673, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Vulnerable Trade: The Dark Side of an Edgeworth Box," Working Papers 0411, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward P., 2008. "Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey," Working Papers 2008-7, Suffolk University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hoffmann, Magnus, 2006. "Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy," MPRA Paper 3260, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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