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Trade and Security,I: Anarchy

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  • James E. Anderson
  • Douglas Marcouiller

Abstract

Market exchange is subject to an endogenously determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. We construct a model in which utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge: autarky (with no predation and no defense), insecure exchange equilibria (with predation and defense), and secure exchange equilibria (in which defense completely deters predation). Trading equilibria, two-thirds of them secure, are supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Since changes in the technologies of defense and predation have terms of trade effects, some producers may be hurt by enhanced security. We show cases of immiserizing security' in which producers in large poor countries are harmed by increased security.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6223.

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Date of creation: Oct 1997
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6223

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  1. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1996. "Insecure Properties and the Stability of Exchange," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 95-96-8, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
  3. Marcouiller, Douglas & Young, Leslie, 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 630-46, June.
  4. Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, 1995. "How wide is the border?," Research Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 95-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  5. McCallum, John, 1995. "National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 615-23, June.
  6. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March.
  7. Trefler, Daniel, 1995. "The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1029-46, December.
  8. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
  9. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Scholarly Articles 3606235, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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