Mediation and Peace
AbstractThis paper applies mechanism design to conict resolution. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict in a game with asymmetric information. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conict is high, or when asymmetric information is significant. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more effective than mediators who only make non-binding recommendations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2011/19.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1765, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/32, European University Institute.
- Horner, Johannes & Morelli, Massimo & Squintani, Francesco, 2011. "Mediation and Peace," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 67, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000133, David K. Levine.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2011-06-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995.
"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Calvert, Randall L., 1992. "A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 347-372, July.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
- Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005.
"A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5075, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 163-183, May.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 169-203, January.
- Tomz, Michael, 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(04), pages 821-840, October.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1979.
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Yıldızparlak, Anıl, 2013. "Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 116-126.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcia Gastaldo).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.