Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict
AbstractThis is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 751.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 13 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
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Democracy; Autocracy; War; Maximal Equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Tangerås, 2009. "Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 99-117, April.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-07-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-07-05 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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