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War and Democracy

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Author Info
Hess, Gregory D.
Orphanides, Athanasios

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Abstract

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of conflict based on a world populated by representative democracies. At the individual state level, when information regarding a leader's ability to defend the state against unavoidable conflict is va luable to voters, an incumbent leader seeking reelection may be tempted into potentially avoidable conflicts to demonstrate his ability and enhance his reelection prospects. As a result, democratic states may be responsible for at least some international conflict. In this paper, we investigate whether this motive is sufficiently important for war to persist in equilibrium if all countries are democracies. Three key findings emerge. First, the perpetual peace equilibrium hypothesized by Immanuel Kant (1795, 1991) always exists. The reason is that in the absence of the threat of war, leaders are unable to divert the public's attention away from domestic considerations. Consequently, the incentive for potentially avoidable conflicts vanishes. Second, if leader s are not sufficiently benevolent and wars are costly in expectation, then additional equilibria exist with a positive war frequency. Third, if multiple equilibria exist, the perpetual peace equilibrium may be unstable in which case an equilibrium with po sitive war frequency becomes the only stable outcome. The model is further extended to analyze the role of appropriative conflicts and non-democratic regimes. It is shown that if the diversionary motive of democratic leaders is strong, a more democratic world may not necessarily be more peaceful. We discuss the role that norms and institutions can play in facilitating a more peaceful world with democracies - for example, free trade areas and alliance formation.

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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 201.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_201

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Related research
Keywords: War Democracy Kant Hypothesis

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
    Other versions:
  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Garfinkel, M.R., 1992. "Domestic Politics and International Conflict," Papers 90-92-30, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
  5. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mandler, Michael & Spagat, Michael, 2003. "Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities can Increase Them," CEPR Discussion Papers 4004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hodler, R. & Loertscher , S. & Rohner, D., 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0738, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Levy, Amnon, 2004. "Trucefully Yours: Hatred and the Prospects of Genuine and Stable Peace," Economics Working Papers wp04-06, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  4. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2004. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Terrorism," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 995, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  6. Herschel Grossman, 2003. "Fifty-four Forty or Fight!," NBER Working Papers 9635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Vote-share Contracts and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dustin Beckett & Gregory Hess, 2008. "All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Thoenig, Mathias, 2005. "Make Trade not War?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Herschel I. Grossman, 2004. "Peace and War in Territorial Disputes," NBER Working Papers 10601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]
  12. Herschel I. Grossman, 2003. "Choosing Between Peace and War," NBER Working Papers 10180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Iyigun, Murat, 2008. "Lessons from the Ottoman Harem (On Ethnicity, Religion and War)," IZA Discussion Papers 3556, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  14. Levy, Amnon & Faria, João Ricardo, 2002. "Conflict, Political Structure and Economic Growth in Dual-Population Lands," Economics Working Papers wp02-19, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia. [Downloadable!]
  15. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Papers 75, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," IEW - Working Papers iewwp371, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  17. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory Hess, 2004. "How Much Does Violence Tax Trade?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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