The Salient Issue of Issue Salience
AbstractThis paper proposes a model where the set of issues that are decisive in an election (i.e., the set of salient issues) is endogenous. The model takes into account a key feature of the policy-making process, namely, that the decision-maker faces time and budget constraints that prevent him from addressing all of the issues that are on the agenda. We show that this feature creates a rationale for a policy-motivated decision-maker to manipulate his policy choice in order to influence which issues will be salient in the next election. We identify three motivations for the decision-maker to manipulate his policy choice for salience purposes. One is to make salient an issue on which he has an electoral advantage. A second motivation is to defuse the salience of an issue on which he is electorally weak, which is accomplished by either implicitly committing to a policy outcome or triggering a change of salient issue for the challenger. A third motivation is to induce the opposition party to nominate a candidate who, if elected, will implement a policy that the incumbent decision maker finds more palatable. Copyright � 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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- Hodler, R. & Loertscher , S. & Rohner, D., 2007.
"Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage,"
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- Elena Manzoni & Stefan P. Penczynski, 2013.
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- Caterina Gennaioli, 2010. "Go Divisive or Not? How Political Campaigns Affect Turnout," CESifo Working Paper Series 3298, CESifo Group Munich.
- Christopher Cotton & Arnaud Dellis, 2012. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," Working Papers 2013-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Roland Hodler, 2011. "Elections and the strategic use of budget deficits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 149-161, July.
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