Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage
AbstractWe present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
Issue (Month): 9-10 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Elections Incumbency advantage Political economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 996, The University of Melbourne.
- Hodler, R. & Loertscher , S. & Rohner, D., 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0738, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmen Bevia & Humberto Llavador, 2006.
"The Informational Value of Incumbency,"
276, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Humberto Llavador & Carmen Beviá, 2006. "The informational value of incumbency," Economics Working Papers 962, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Carmen Bevi? & Humberto Llavador, 2006. "The Informational Value of Incumbency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 662.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Alesina, Alberto & Cukierman, Alex, 1990.
"The Politics of Ambiguity,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-50, November.
- Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001.
"War and Democracy,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
- Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005.
"Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
- Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies," NBER Working Papers 10539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cox, Gary W. & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "Why Did The Incumbency Advantage In U.S. House Elections Grow?," Working Papers 939, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
- Wolfers Justin & Zitzewitz Eric, 2004.
"Experimental Political Betting Markets and the 2004 Election,"
The Economists' Voice,
De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-8, October.
- Wolfers, Justin & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2004. "Experimental Political Betting Markets and the 2004 Election," Working paper 430, Regulation2point0.
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990.
"A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt,"
3612769, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July.
- Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997.
"When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China,"
30-97, Tel Aviv.
- Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2004.
"On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,"
859, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2004. "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Working Papers 4, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
- Arnaud Dellis, 2009. "The Salient Issue of Issue Salience," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 203-231, 04.
- Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
- Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
- Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988.
"Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,"
NBER Working Papers
1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger & Edwards, Sebastian, 1990. "Macroeconomic populism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 247-277, April.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
- Robert J. Blendon, 1997. "Bridging the Gap between the Public's and Economists' Views of the Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 105-118, Summer.
- Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
- Joseph M. Johnson & W. Mark Crain, 2004. "Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Democratic Nations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 73-90, 04.
- Besley, Timothy, 2007. "Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199283910.
- Schelker, Mark, 2011.
"Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable,"
Economics Working Paper Series
1130, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Mar 2012.
- Mark Schelker, 2011. "Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable," CESifo Working Paper Series 3523, CESifo Group Munich.
- Elena Manzoni & Stefan P. Penczynski, 2013.
"Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage,"
229, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2013.
- Lind, J.T. & Rohner, D., 2011.
"Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
1161, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2011. "Knowledge is power: a theory of information, income, and welfare spending," ECON - Working Papers 036, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2013. "Knowledge is power - A theory of information, income, and welfare spending," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Lind, Jo Thori & Rhoner, Dominic, 2011. "Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending," Memorandum 26/2011, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2011. "Knowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 3613, CESifo Group Munich.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 995, The University of Melbourne.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010.
"Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions,"
10.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Roland Hodler, 2011. "Elections and the strategic use of budget deficits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 149-161, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.