This paper highlights the role of hatred and its evolution in determining the course of conflicts between nations following their signing of an agreement for truce. It analytically demonstrates that weak inertia, diminishing memory of hatred and a low propensity to reciprocate aversion are essential for reaching a genuine and stable peace. These propositions are employed to assess the prospects of genuine and stable peace between Israel and Palestine. It is argued that due to inertia, strong memory of collective hatred and high propensity to reciprocate collective aversion, the inherent course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not lead to a genuine and stable peace.
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Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia in its series Economics Working Papers with number
wp04-06.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001.
"War and Democracy,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
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