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Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future

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  • Michael McBride

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stergios Skaperdas

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict, the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. Then, we show that as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We discuss the applicability of this finding in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.

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File URL: http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/economics/docs/workingpapers/2008-09/mcbride-22.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 080922.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:080922

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Keywords: Conflict; Litigation; Property rights; Folk theorem;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ke, Changxia & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 420, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Proprietary Public Finance: On its Emergence and Evolution out of Anarchy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3495, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) SP II 2013-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  4. Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2011. "Peace and War With Endogenous State Capacity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 446-468, June.
  5. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2010. "Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited," Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics 101107, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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