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Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future

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Author Info
Michael McBride () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)
Stergios Skaperdas () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

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Abstract

In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict, the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. Then, we show that as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We discuss the applicability of this finding in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important.

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File URL: http://www.economics.uci.edu/docs/2008-09/mcbride-22.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 080922.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:080922

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Related research
Keywords: Conflict; Litigation; Property rights; Folk theorem;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  4. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
  5. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2008. "On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2185-2202, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Governance and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 505-518, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War," NBER Working Papers 14801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Delay in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1169-1178, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Pedro Dal Bó, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Richardson, Gary & McBride, Michael, 2009. "Religion, longevity, and cooperation: The case of the craft guild," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 172-186, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
    • Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Discussion Papers 94, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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