On The Economics oF Organized Crime
AbstractThe core function of organized crime is the selling of protection. Protection can be real, against third-party crime, or manufactured by the organized crime groups themselves. Mafias and gangs emerge in areas of weak state control, because of prohibition and geographic, ethnic, or social isolation. Although competition is considered good in economics, in the case of organized crime the predatory competition that is more likely to take place is harmful. The costs of organized crime include the resources expended on the activity, more ordinary productive and investment distortions, as well as other dynamic effects on occupational choice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 070815.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Law and economics; Property rights; Governance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2008-03-08 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-03-08 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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