Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization
AbstractIn this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Other versions of this item:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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