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The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State

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Author Info
Konrad, Kai A
Skaperdas, Stergios

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Abstract

We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups of by for-profit entrepreneurs: kings, lords, or mafia dons. Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the stable market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low or lower than in the absence of a state.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2173.

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Date of creation: Jun 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2173

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Related research
Keywords: Governance; Origin of State; Protection; Security;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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  2. Grossman, Herschel I. & Noh, Suk Jae, 1994. "Proprietary public finance and economic welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 187-204, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1997. "Credible threats in extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Gangs as Primitive States," Papers 92-93-13, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
  7. Herschel I. Grossman, 1997. ""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State," NBER Working Papers 6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Keith N. Hylton, 1996. "Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 197-206, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  14. Ben-Shahar, Omri & Harel, Alon, 1995. "Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 434-55, October.
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2007. "A Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth," JEPS Working Papers 07-004, JEPS. [Downloadable!]
  4. Murat Iyigun, 2006. "Ottoman Conquests and European Ecclesiastical Pluralism," IZA Discussion Papers 1973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Gustavo Federico Torrens, 2008. "The economic value of ideology," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 378, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Milante, Gary, 2007. "A kleptocrat's survival guide : autocratic longevity in the face of civil conflict," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4186, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Konrad, Kai A & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," CEPR Discussion Papers 6333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "¿A quién le hacen falta líderes autoritarios?," RES Working Papers 4564, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Iyigun, Murat, 2008. "Lessons from the Ottoman Harem (On Ethnicity, Religion and War)," IZA Discussion Papers 3556, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Jean-Pierre Tranchant, 2005. "Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights," Public Economics 0506006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Martin Mcguire, 2002. "Property Distribution And Configurations Of Sovereign States: A Rational Economic Model," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 251-270, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Herschel I. Grossman, 1997. ""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State," NBER Working Papers 6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War," Working Papers 060715, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "Who Needs Strong Leaders?," RES Working Papers 4563, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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