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The theory of contests: a survey

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Author Info
Luis Corchón ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 11 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 69-100
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100

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Related research
Keywords: Contests; Conflict; Institutions; C70; D20; D74; N00; P16; O11;

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Governance and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    Other versions:
  8. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Tullock And Hirshleifer: A Meeting Of The Minds," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fang, Hanming, 2002. " Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 351-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999. " Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Effort and performance in group contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 769-781, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December. [Downloadable!]
  17. Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Foundations For Contest Success Functions," Economics Working Papers we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  18. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Kip Viscusi, W. & Boyd, Roy, 1995. "The coase theorem in rent-seeking society," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 259-268, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2006. "On the social efficiency of conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 96-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1999. "Collective Action and Group Size Paradox," Papers 23, El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro Barrie de la Maza.
  25. Perez-Castrillo, J David & Verdier, Thierry, 1992. " A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 335-50, April.
  26. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Governance and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 505-518, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Thomas Cusack & Amihai Glazer & Kai Konrad, 2007. "Introduction," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 179-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  31. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. " Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
  32. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  33. Nugent, Jeffrey B. & Sanchez, Nicolas, 1989. "The efficiency of the mesta: A parable," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 261-284, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  34. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, 2009. "Sports Really are Different: The Contest Success Function and the Supply of Talent," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-80, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jörg Franke & Tahir Öztürk, 2009. "Conflict Networks," Ruhr Economic Papers 0116, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
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