Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution
AbstractIn this I article derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehension when victim precaution is taken into account. I show that in the area of intentional offenses, the optimal penalty is less than the level that internalizes the victim's harm plus the state's cost of enforcement.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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- Philip A. Curry & Matthew Doyle, 2012. "Social Welfare and the Benefits to Crime," Working Papers 1205, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2012.
- Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005.
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- Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2012. "The market for protection and the origin of the state," Munich Reprints in Economics 13961, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, 2008. "Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications," Working Papers 2008-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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