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A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism

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  • Francesco Parisi
  • Jonathan Klick
  • Nuno Garoupa

Abstract

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number 2006-09.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2006-09

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2012. "Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 33-41.

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