Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique
AbstractThis article attempts to determine the optimal antitrust policy against price-fixing when competition authorities imperfectly observe firms' behaviour. By investigating or auditing on markets, authorities can detect collusion. We show that the strenght of investigations depends on the characteristics of the market, the cost of investigation, the severity of punishment and the degree of stability of the collusion. Moreover, it is shown that authorities always tolerate some degree of collusion as long as investigation is costly. The results of our paper allow us to establish some guidelines for antitrust policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 99-26.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Thierry PÉNARD & Saïd SOUAM, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 66, pages 209-233.
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- Le Pape, Nicolas & Zhao, Kai, 2013. "Horizontal mergers and uncertainty," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-62, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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