Delegation, Incentives and Antitrust Enforcement
AbstractWe analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspectorthe mission of gathering the su¢cient information to condemn a cartel. The authorityhas two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of thecollected …ne or providing him with information which enhances the probability ofthe success of the prosecution. More precisely, we explore the e¢ciency consequencesof a contest between the audit inspector and the cartel. Both of them bid to winthe contest by expending e¤orts. We show that the race issue depends positively onthe …nancial incentives proposed to the inspector but the impact of an increase ofthe level of the …ne, to be paid once an illegal agreement is detected, is ambiguous.Moreover, we show that the optimal combination of the two instruments consistsin two regimes. When the marginal cost of providing the relevant information isrelatively high, the antitrust authority equally shares the collected …ne and does notprovide the inspector with any information. Conversely, when this marginal cost isrelatively small, the authority uses the two instruments. She has to provide him withthe maximum level of information consistent with winning the contest with certainty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2004-41.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sorgard, Lars, 2013.
"Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge,"
Discussion Paper Series in Economics
4/2013, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond & Sørgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2013/2, University of Stavanger.
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sørgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," Discussion Papers 2013/5, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Florian Sallaberry).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.