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The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

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Author Info
Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Shavell, Steven
Abstract

This chapter surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law--the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of the analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society's resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? A variety of extensions of the central theory are then examined, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions.

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This chapter was published in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.) , Elsevier, chapter 06, pages 403-454, 2007.

This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Law and Economics with number 1-06.

Handle: RePEc:eee:lawchp:1-06

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Web page: http://www.elsevierdirect.com/product.jsp?isbn=9780444512352

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Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Keywords: public enforcement of law; fines; imprisonment; strict liability; fault-based liability; probability of detection; errors; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; fairness of sanctions; norms;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K - Law and Economics

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  2. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2009. "Optimal Policies and the Informal Sector," Working Papers 2009-12, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 10 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2009. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 170, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2009. [Downloadable!]
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