Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay
AbstractA model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 661.
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2011
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Procurement; Corruption; Rent-seeking; Development;
Other versions of this item:
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," CEPR Discussion Papers 8282, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Flochel, Thomas & Straub, Stéphane, 2011. "Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay," TSE Working Papers 11-224, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O5 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2011-05-14 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-LAM-2011-05-14 (Central & South America)
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