This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Claudio Ferraz () (IPEA, Brazil)
Frederico Finan () (University of California, Los Angeles and IZA)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountability. Based upon the results of Brazil’s recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent’s likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations. These findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
2836.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2836Contact details of provider: Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49 228 3894 223 Fax: +49 228 3894 180 Web page: http://www.iza.org
Order Information: Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark Fallak).
Keywords: corruption ; political agency ; transparency ; information ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003.
"A free press is bad news for corruption ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002.
"The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Majumdar, Sumon & Mani, Anandi & Mukand, Sharun W., 2004.
"Politics, information and the urban bias ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 137-165, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2002.
"The Corporate Governance Role of the Media ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Matthew Rabin, 1998.
"Psychology and Economics ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997.
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
Other versions:
Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, .
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability ,"
Working Papers
100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
[Downloadable!] Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997.
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2007.
"Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2843, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Alesina, Alberto & Cukierman, Alex, 1990.
"The Politics of Ambiguity ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-50, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Keefer, Philip & Khemani, Stuti, 2003.
"Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3164, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
David Strömberg, 2004.
"Radio's Impact on Public Spending ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 189-221, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005.
"Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India ,"
STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series
08, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005.
"Political Selection and the Quality ofGovernment: Evidence from South India ,"
STICERD - Development Economics Papers
44, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!] Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005.
"Political Selection and the Qualilty of Government: Evidence from South India ,"
Working Papers
921, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
[Downloadable!] Besley, Timothy J. & Pande, Rohini & Rao, Vijayendra, 2005.
"Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Rudiger Ahrend, 2002.
"Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption ,"
DELTA Working Papers
2002-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
[Downloadable!]
Benjamin A. Olken, 2007.
"Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 200-249.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003.
"The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-92, April.
Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2005.
"Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 259-267, 04/05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dean Yang, 2005.
"Integrity for Hire: An Analysis of a Widespread Program for Combating Customs Corruption ,"
Working Papers
525, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Pande, Rohini, 2007.
"Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries ,"
Working Paper Series
rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]
Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & López-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2009.
"Disclosure by Politicians ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2008.
"Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment ,"
CEIS Research Paper
115, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 14 Jul 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Andrea Prat & Oriana Bandiera & Tommaso Valletti, 2007.
"Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment ,"
Levine's Bibliography
843644000000000100, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Bandiera, Oriana & Prat, Andrea & Valletti, Tommaso, 2008.
"Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2009.
"Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1278-1308, September.
[Downloadable!] Pande, Rohini, 2007.
"Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fernanda Brollo, 2008.
"Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians – Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program ,"
Working Papers
336, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
[Downloadable!]
Ginger Zhe Jin & Alex Whalley, 2007.
"The Power of Attention: Do Rankings Affeect the Financial Resources of Public Colleges? ,"
NBER Working Papers
12941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2007.
"Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2843, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Fernanda Brollo, 2008.
"Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians - Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program ,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series
dp-168, Boston University - Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2007.
"Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study for a Cross-Section of Countries ,"
Emory Economics
0709, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Marcos Chamon & João Manoel Pinho de Mello & Sergio Firpo, 2008.
"Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending : regression discontinuity evidence from Brazilian municipalities ,"
Textos para discussão
559, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
[Downloadable!]
Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2007.
"Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities ,"
NBER Working Papers
13535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2008.
"Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2008s-26, CIRANO.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .