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What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

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  • Kishore Gawande
  • Pravin Krishna
  • Marcelo Olarreaga

Abstract

Policy making power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This paper investigates quantitatively the welfare mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14953.

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Date of creation: May 2009
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Publication status: published as Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009. "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(03), pages 491-532, July.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14953

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Cited by:
  1. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
  2. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2009. "Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50299, World Bank.
  3. Borchert, Ingo & Gootiiz, Batshur & Grover, Arti & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2012. "Landlocked or policy locked ? how services trade protection deepens economic isolation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5942, The World Bank.
  4. Liu, Xuepeng & Ornelas, Emanuel, 2013. "Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 9279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Giacomo Ponzetto, 2011. "Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy," Working Papers 596, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Bown, Chad P. & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Trade liberalization, antidumping, and safeguards: Evidence from India's tariff reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 115-125, September.
  7. Arcand, Jean-Louis & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Zoratto, Laura, 2011. "Weak Governments and Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 8595, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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