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Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation

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Author Info
Phillip McCalman

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Abstract

The paper uses Grossman and Helpman's "protection for sale" model (1994) to analyze the process of trade liberalization that has occurred in Australia. First, this paper verifies that the predictions of the "protection for sale" model are consistent with the data. Then, it analyzes the endogenous dimension of the Australian experience of trade liberalization. The estimated structural parameters imply that the process of trade liberalization has been driven by increases in both the fraction of the voting population represented by lobbies, and the government's relative valuation of welfare (the former playing the more prominent role). Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00432.x/enhancedabs
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 81-94
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Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:12:y:2004:i:1:p:81-94

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  1. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, . "Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing," Development Working Papers 207, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. kishore gawande & hui li, 2005. "Trade Barriers As Bargaining Outcomes," International Trade 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2002. "The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Rigoberto A. Lopez & Xenia Matschke, 2005. "Food Protection for Sale," Working papers 2005-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Xenia Matschke, 2006. "Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation," Working papers 2006-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Willmann, Gerald, 2003. "Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs," Economics working papers 2003,10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 5634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2006. "Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?," Working Papers 1114, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Roberto Álvarez & Matías Braun, 2006. "Trade Liberalization, Price Distortions, and Resource Reallocation," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 374, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  10. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2006. "Selling Protection for Sale," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
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