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Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

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  • Susumu Imai
  • Hajime Katayama
  • Kala Krishna

Abstract

This paper critically and selectively surveys the literature on protection for sale and discusses directions for future research in this area. It suggests that the standard approach needs to be augmented to provide more compelling tests of this model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13899.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Publication status: published as Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Is protection really for sale? A survey and directions for future research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-191, March.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13899

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References

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  1. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2010. "A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University gd10-140, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2005. "Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing," Development Working Papers 207, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  3. Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, January.
  4. Matschke, Xenia N. & Sherlund, Shane M, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt82k4x4f5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  5. Hiau Looi Kee & Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2008. "Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distortions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 666-682, November.
  6. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
  7. Shiells, C.R. & Stern, R.M. & Deardorff, A.V., 1988. "Estimates Of The Elasticities Of Substitution Between Imports And Home Goods For The United States: Reply," Working Papers, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 235, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  8. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2007. "Market access for sale," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 79-94, January.
  9. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
  10. By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, 02.
  11. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  12. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldbe & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August.
  14. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December.
  15. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  16. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2006. "Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?," NBER Working Papers 12258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
  19. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
  20. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
  21. Kishore Gawande, 1998. "Comparing Theories Of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison Of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 128-140, February.
  22. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios Thomakos & Mehmet Ulubasoglu, 2006. "Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the `protection for sale' model?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(1), pages 187-210, February.
  23. Choi, E. Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2003. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  25. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade, EconWPA 0503003, EconWPA.
  26. Chernozhukov, Victor & Hansen, Christian, 2006. "Instrumental quantile regression inference for structural and treatment effect models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(2), pages 491-525, June.
  27. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, 02.
  28. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Reconsidering the empirical evidence on the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 501-516, May.
  29. Marianna Belloc, 2007. "Protection for Sale in the EU," Working Papers, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics 100, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ludema, Rodney D & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2010. "Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7926, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Baybars Karacaovali, 2012. "Trade Policy Determinants and Trade Reform in a Developing Country: The Case of Colombia," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201220R, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  3. Douhan, Robin & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2010. "Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Jennifer Abel-Koch, 2013. "Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 1306, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.
  5. Natália Barbosa & Maria Helena Guimarães & Ana Paula Faria, 2013. "Single Market non-compliance: how relevant is the institutional setting?," NIPE Working Papers, NIPE - Universidade do Minho 06/2013, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  6. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Trade Policy Determinants and Trade Reform in a Developing Country," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics 201115, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.

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