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Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?

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  • Susumu Imai
  • Hajime Katayama
  • Kala Krishna

Abstract

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman %u201Cprotection for sale (PFS)%u201D model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12258.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Publication status: published as Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12258

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bradley J. McDonald & Christian Henn, 2011. "Protectionist Responses to the Crisis," IMF Working Papers 11/139, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2007. "A Quantile Based Test of Protection for Sale Model," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1132, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  3. Marianna Belloc, 2007. "Protection for Sale in the EU," Working Papers, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics 100, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  4. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Is protection really for sale? A survey and directions for future research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-191, March.
  5. Xenia Matschke, 2005. "Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2005-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007.
  6. Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Lobbying costs and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 126-136, March.
  7. Joseph Mai & Andrey Stoyanov, 2014. "The Effect of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian," Working Papers, York University, Department of Economics 2014_2, York University, Department of Economics.
  8. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2006. "Selling Protection for Sale," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2006.
  9. Marianna Belloc, 2014. "Neo-Protectionism and the European Lobbies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4832, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Ethier, Wilfred J., 2007. "The theory of trade policy and trade agreements: A critique," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 605-623, September.

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