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Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing

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Author Info
Giovanni Facchini (University of Illinois and University of Milan)
Johannes Van Biesebroeck (University of Toronto and NBER)
Gerald Willmann (University of Kiel)

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Abstract

The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model explains tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying game between special interests and the government. Most empirical implementations of this framework use instead non-tariff barriers to measure the extent of protection. Importantly, while the former set of instruments allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, the latter does not. As a result, structurally estimating the ‘protection for sale’ model using data on non-tariff barriers is likely to lead to biased parameter estimates. To address this problem, we augment Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model by explicitly considering trade policy instruments allowing only partial capturing. Taking our specification to the data, we find that, on average, 72–75 percent of the rent is actually captured. Furthermore, we obtain more realistic, lower estimates of the implied share of the population involved in lobbying activities than in the previous literature, while the estimated weight of aggregate welfare in the objective function of the government is as high as in previous studies.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano in its series Development Working Papers with number 207.

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Date of creation: 15 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:csl:devewp:207

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Related research
Keywords: Protection for Sale; Non-tariff Barriers; Partial Rent Capturing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nelson, Forrest & Olson, Lawrence, 1978. "Specification and Estimation of a Simultaneous-Equation Model with Limited Dependent Variables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(3), pages 695-709, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
  5. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios Thomakos & Mehmet Ulubasoglu, 2006. "Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the `protection for sale' model?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(1), pages 187-210, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Scott Bradford, 2003. "Paying the Price: Final Goods Protection in OECD Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 24-37, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Maskus, Keith E. & Wilson, John S. & Tsunehiro Otsuki, 2000. "Quantifying the impact of technical barriers to trade : a framework for analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2512, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Xenia Matschke & Shane Sherlund, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1029, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2004. "Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 10205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Smith, Richard J & Blundell, Richard W, 1986. "An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 679-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1979. "The Estimation of a Simultaneous-Equation Tobit Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 169-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  19. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 1997. "Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 179, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  21. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Hadi Salehi Esfahani, 2005. "Searching for the (dark) forces behind protection," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 283-314, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carolyn L. Evans & Shane M. Sherlund, 2006. "Are antidumping duties for sale? case-level evidence on the Grossman-Helpman protection for sale model," International Finance Discussion Papers 888, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  2. Marianna Belloc, 2007. "Protection for Sale in the EU," Working Papers 100, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Giovanni Facchini & Marcelo Olarreaga & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2007. "Substitutability and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2006. "Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?," Working Papers 1114, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2008. "Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research," NBER Working Papers 13899, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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