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Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil

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  • Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro
  • Facchini, Giovanni

Abstract

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988-1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced,more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline speci.cation, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 45 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (May)
Pages: 432-446
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Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:45:y:2005:i:2-3:p:432-446

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  1. Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May.
  2. Frederico Valladares & Cristina Terra, 2004. "Real Exchange Rate Misalignments," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 191, Econometric Society.
  3. Assunção, Juliano Junqueira & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2004. "Land taxes in a Latin American context," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 526, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  4. Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Costa, Cristiano Machado & Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares, 2004. "Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 525, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  5. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
  6. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
  7. Leonardo Souza & Jeremy Smith & Reinaldo Souza, 2006. "Convex combinations of long memory estimates from different sampling rates," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-413, December.
  8. Olarreaga, Marcelo & Soloaga, Isidro, 1998. "Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 297-320, May.
  9. Maggi, G & Rodriguez-Clare, A, 1996. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Papers 180, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  10. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  11. Pabo Sanguinetti & Alok Bohara & Kishore Guatanabe, 2003. "Trade Diverion and Declinning Tariffs: Evidence from MERCOSUR," Department of Economics Working Papers 003, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  12. Aloisio Araujo & Humberto Moreira, 2004. "The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 152, Econometric Society.
  13. Souza, Leonardo Rocha, 2003. "A note on Chambers's "long memory and aggregation in macroeconomic time series"," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 503, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  14. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
  15. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe, 2003. "Equilibria in security markets with a continuum of agents," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 513, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  16. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
  17. Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira & JosÈ Luiz Rossi, 2003. "New Evidence from Brazil on Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1383-1405, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Productivity Matters For Trade Policy: Theory And Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 33-62, 02.
  2. Torfinn Harding and Jørn Rattsø, 2009. "Industrial labor productivities and tariffs in South Africa. Identification based on multilateral liberalization reform," Discussion Papers 585, Research Department of Statistics Norway.

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