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Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

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  • Costa, Cristiano M.
  • Ferreira, Daniel
  • Moreira, Humberto

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4DVT8R4-3/2/a4f183a49ad855f89ea9009d52ea64b0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 86 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 379-385

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:86:y:2005:i:3:p:379-385

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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References

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  1. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 2002. "Organization Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(7), pages 852-865, July.
  2. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
  3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
  4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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Cited by:
  1. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2004. "First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 568, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  2. Xiao, Zhijie & Lima, Luiz Renato Regis de Oliveira, 2004. "Purchasing power parity and the unit root tests: A robust analysis," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 552, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  3. Cavalcanti Ferreira, Pedro & Facchini, Giovanni, 2005. "Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 432-446, May.
  4. Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2004. "The set of equilibria of first-price auctions," Microeconomics 0403001, EconWPA.
  5. Carrasco, Vinicius, 2010. "Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 264-268, September.

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