In this note I show that pratically any increasing function is the equilibrium bidding function of a symmetric first-price auction. It is like a Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu for auctions
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0403001.
Length: 6 pages Date of creation: 05 Mar 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0403001
Note: Type of Document - Pdf file; prepared on Windows 2000; to print on hp; pages: 6; figures: none Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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