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Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions

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Author Info
Eric Maskin () (School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study)
John Riley () (Department of Economics, University of California Los Angeles)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0031.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0031

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Related research
Keywords: Sealed High-Bid Auctions Equilibrium

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
R10 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Jeroen Swinkels, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 1192, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bernard Lebrun, 1996. "Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-443.
  5. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Lebrun, Bernard, 1996. "Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-43, April.
  9. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sergio Parreiras, 2006. "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1304-1304. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sushil Bikhchandani & John G. Riley, 1988. "A Characterization of Equilibria in Common Value Second-Price and Open-Exit Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 474, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  4. Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2006. "Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 1422, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1366-1366. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2004. "First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 568, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 122, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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