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Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eric Maskin () (School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study)
John Riley () (Department of Economics, University of California Los Angeles)
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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number
0031.
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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003Date of revision:
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Keywords: Sealed High-Bid Auctions Equilibrium Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles R10 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jackson, Matthew O. & Jeroen Swinkels, 2004.
"Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions ,"
Working Papers
1192, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Milgrom, Paul R, 1981.
"Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin, 2001.
"Auctions and Efficiency ,"
Economics Working Papers
0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Bernard Lebrun, 1996.
"Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions (*) ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-443.
Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000.
"Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000.
"Asymmetric Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Lebrun, Bernard, 1996.
"Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-43, April.
Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000.
"Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Sergio Parreiras, 2006.
"Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case ,"
Contributions to Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1304-1304.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sushil Bikhchandani & John G. Riley, 1988.
"A Characterization of Equilibria in Common Value Second-Price and Open-Exit Auctions ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
474, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002.
"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions ,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp292, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]
Johannes Horner & Julian Jamison, 2006.
"Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
1422, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007.
"Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions ,"
Topics in Theoretical Economics ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1366-1366.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007.
"Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2004.
"First-Price auction symmetric equlibria with a general distribution ,"
Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
568, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Rene Kirkegaard, 2005.
"A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions ,"
Working Papers
0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
[Downloadable!]
Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004.
"Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information ,"
ESE Discussion Papers
122, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
[Downloadable!]
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