Asymmetric First-Price Menu Auctions under Intricate Uncertainty
AbstractThis paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifi es a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus o ffered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number seungjin_han-2011-9.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 25 May 2011
Date of revision: 02 Apr 2013
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first-price menu auction; interdependent values; monotone equilibria; joint ex-post renegotiation-proofness; ex-ante robustness;
Other versions of this item:
- Han, Seungjin, 2013. "Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2068-2095.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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