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Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions

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  • David McAdams
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    Abstract

    In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

    Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 1039-1056

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:4:p:1039-1056

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    Cited by:
    1. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008. "Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981.
    2. Kastl, Jakub, 2012. "On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 339-352.
    3. Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, David K. Levine.
    4. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa, International Association of Agricultural Economists 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Exeter University, Department of Economics 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    6. Oczkowski, Edward, 2008. "Excess Demand, Market Power and Price Adjustment in Clearinghouse Auction Markets for Water," Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), School of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(2), pages 261-276, September.
    7. Paulo Barelli & John Duggan, 2011. "Extremal Choice Equilibrium: Existence and Purification with Infinite-Dimensional Externalities," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 567, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    8. Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Asymmetric First-Price Menu Auctions under Intricate Uncertainty," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics seungjin_han-2011-9, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
    9. McAdams, David, 2008. "Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-85, September.
    10. Galavotti, Stefano, 2009. "Bilateral trade with apositional traders," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 172-188, September.
    11. Michal Bresky, 2009. "Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague wp384, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
    12. McAdams, David, 2002. "Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management 4249-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    13. John Roberts, 2008. "Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 181-98, Fall.
    14. repec:bfi:wpaper:2009-009 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Michal Bresky, 2008. "Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague wp376, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.

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