Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 137 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2011.
"Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness,"
CEIS Research Paper
196, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jun 2011.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
- Han, Seungjin, 2013.
"Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2068-2095.
- Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Asymmetric First-Price Menu Auctions under Intricate Uncertainty," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-9, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday, 2010.
"On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 376-380, January.
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2007. "On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard," LSF Research Working Paper Series 07-01, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
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