Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
AbstractExistence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is established in the discriminatory and uniform S + a-th price (a in [0, 1]) auctions of S identical objects when bidders are risk-neutral with independent signals. The model requires discrete price / quantity grids and allows for multi-dimensional signals, interdependent values, increasing marginal values, allocative externalities, and two-sided trading. Given no externalities, further, all mixed-strategy equilibria in these auctions must be ex post allocation- and interim expected payment equivalent to some monotone pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, for standard expected surplus / revenue analysis, there is no loss in restricting attention to monotone strategies
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 211.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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multi-unit auctions; monotone equilibria;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- McAdams, David, 2002. "Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction," Working papers 4249-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- John Roberts, 2008. "Susan C. Athey: John Bates Clark Award Winner 2007," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 181-98, Fall.
- Philip J Reny, 2005.
"On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- Philip J. Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000067, David K. Levine.
- Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, David K. Levine.
- Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
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