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Non-Monotoniticies And The All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule

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Author Info
Aloisio Araujo ()
Luciano I. de Castro ()
Humberto Moreira ()

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Abstract

Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we065924.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we065924

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  1. Aloisio Araújo & Humberto Moreira, 2000. "Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition," Textos para discussão 424, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  2. Zheng, Charles Z., 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 129-171, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 300, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and Non-monotonic auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  7. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp292, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "First-Price Auction Symmetric Equilibria with a General Distribution," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 616, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
  11. Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2000. "Adverse Selection Problems Without the Spence-Mirrlees Condition," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 389, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  12. Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Matthew O. Jackson & Leo K. Simon & Jeroen M. Swinkels & William R. Zame, 2002. "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1711-1740, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2003. "Non-Monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 512, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  15. Ewerhart, Christian & Fieseler, Karsten, 2003. " Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 569-81, Autumn.
  16. Matthew O. Jackson & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2005. "Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 93-139, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
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  18. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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