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Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments

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Author Info
Taylor, Curtis R
Abstract

Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court. Sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems. A model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor. The winner receives a prespecified prize. The tournament game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants. An optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first-best quality level against the probability of falling short. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 872-90
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:4:p:872-90

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  1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. CRÉMER, Jacques & KHALIL, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marco Faravelli, 2008. "The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0802, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
  4. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Papers 120, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Ufuk Akcigit, 2006. "State-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights Policy," NBER Working Papers 12775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Julien Pénin, 2003. "Patents versus ex-post rewards: a new look," Working Papers of BETA 2003-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Elimination Tournaments where Players Have Fixed Resources," Working Papers 205, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  9. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Non-Monotoniticies And The All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule," Economics Working Papers we065924, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  10. Frode Meland & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Outsourcing in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Aloisio Pessoa de Araújo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho & Humberto Luiz Ataide Moreira, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and Non-monotonic auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  13. Marco Faravelli, 2007. "The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 156, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  14. Julien Pénin, 2003. "Patents versus ex-post rewards : a new look," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-19, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques. [Downloadable!]
  15. Newell, Richard & Wilson, Nathan, 2005. "Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation," Discussion Papers dp-05-33, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  16. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter. [Downloadable!]
  17. Marco Faravelli, 2006. "The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," Working Papers 102, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
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