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How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons

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  • Jehiel, Philippe
  • Moldovanu, Benny
  • Stacchetti, Ennio

Abstract

The authors consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers. These situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity-dependent externality. The authors construct a revenue-maximizing auction for the seller. They observe that outside options and participation constraints are endogenous; the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object; and the seller is better-off by not selling at all (while obtaining some payments) if externalities are much larger than valuations. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 814-29

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:4:p:814-29

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  1. Moet Duitsland Europees kampioen worden?
    by Marco in eco.nomie.nl on 2008-05-20 11:59:43
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