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The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

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  • Kotowski, Maciej H.
  • Li, Fei

Abstract

We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.

Suggested Citation

  • Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 420-423.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:420-423
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
    3. Maskin, Eric S., 2000. "Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 667-681, May.
    4. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2008. "Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 407-440, June.
    5. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1991. "Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 146-172, February.
    6. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2003. "On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 374-392, June.
    7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    8. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
    9. Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Jan 2014.
    10. , & ,, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March.
    11. Alex Gershkov, 2009. "Optimal auctions and information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 335-344, December.
    12. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
    13. Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    War of attrition; Budget constraints; Linkage principle; Auctions; Information disclosure; Contests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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