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The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction

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Author Info
Brusco, Sandro
Lopomo, Giuseppe
Marx, Leslie M.

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Abstract

We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block reserve price, thereby ensuring that the open platform restriction would be applied to the licenses. Later in the auction, other bidders outbid Google, so Google was able to trigger the open platform restriction without having to purchase any of the licenses.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8J-4VXB8R1-1/2/ae3e477e735c8f93c67a8854c85421ba
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Information Economics and Policy.

Volume (Year): 21 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 101-114
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Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:101-114

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549

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Related research
Keywords: Spectrum license Contingent re-auction Open access Open platform;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Maskin, Eric S., 2000. "Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 667-681, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rosenthal, Robert W. & Wang, Ruqu, 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 32-55, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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