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Information about:
Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo in registering through RePEc. If you are Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

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Personal Details

First Name: Giuseppe (Pino)
Middle Name:
Last Name: Lopomo
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: plo38

Email:
Homepage: http://www.fuqua.duke.edu/faculty/alpha/lopomo.htm
Postal Address:
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Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Works

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  2. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    Published as:

  3. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  4. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  5. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000379, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

  6. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2002. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints," Working Papers 02-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  7. Giuseppe Lopomo & Efe A Ok, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000114, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    Published as:

  8. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 1999. "Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities," Working Papers 99-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  9. Lopomo, G. & Ok, E.A., 1998. "Bargaining, Independence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," Working Papers 98-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]

  10. Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing," Industrial Organization 9701001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

  11. Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial Organization 9612003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

  12. Economides, N. & Lopomo, G. & Woroch, G., 1996. "Regulatory Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance," Working Papers 96-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Giuseppe Lopomo & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx, 2005. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1156-1156. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(2), pages 407-36, April.
    Other versions:

  3. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2001. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 219-240, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  4. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Ok, Efe A, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 263-83, Summer.
    Other versions:

  5. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 1998. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 144-166, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  6. Economides, Nicholas & Lopomo, Giuseppe & Woroch, Glenn, 1996. "Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 1013-28.

NEP Fields

9 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (2) 2004-07-18 2004-09-05
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (5) 2004-02-08 2004-07-18 2004-09-05 2004-09-05 2004-09-05 Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2004-07-18
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-16.

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