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Regulatory Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance

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Author Info
Economides, N.
Lopomo, G.
Woroch, G.

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several pricing rules intended to promote entry into a network industry dominated by an incumbent carrier. Drawing on the work of Cournot and Hotelling, we develop a model of competition between two interconnected networks.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 96-14.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:96-14

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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Related research
Keywords: PRICING; COMPETITION; ECONOMIC MODELS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Iimi, Atsushi, 2007. "Price structure and network externalities in the telecommunications industry : evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4200, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Two-way interconnection and the collusive role of the access charge," Industrial Organization 0303011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. James McAndrews & William Roberds, 1997. "A model of check exchange," Working Papers 97-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-28.

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