IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nys/sunysb/18-13.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Financial Contracting and the Effects of Firm's Size

Author

Listed:
  • Sandro Brusco
  • Giuseppe Lopomo
  • Eva Ropero
  • Alessandro T. Villa

Abstract

We consider the design of optimal dynamic financing for a firm subject to moral hazard problems. With respect to the existing literature we enrich the model by introducing durable capital. The existence of durable capital allows us to analyze the role of firm's size, separately from age and financial structure. We find that a higher level of capital decreases the probability of liquidation, increases future size and reduces the average return and volatility on the assets of the firm. Although analytical results are not available, we show through simulations that the rate of growth of capital is decreasing with size and that its variability first increases with size and eventually it declines. These results are broadly in agreement with the empirical results on the effects of firm size.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Eva Ropero & Alessandro T. Villa, 2018. "Optimal Financial Contracting and the Effects of Firm's Size," Department of Economics Working Papers 18-13, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:18-13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2018/ContractingAndFirmSize_1813.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrea Lanteri, 2018. "The Market for Used Capital: Endogenous Irreversibility and Reallocation over the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2383-2419, September.
    2. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 817-847, August.
    3. Evans, David S, 1987. "The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: Estimates for 100 Manufacturing Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 567-581, June.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Hui Chen & Neng Wang, 2011. "A Unified Theory of Tobin's q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1545-1578, October.
    5. Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman, 2007. "Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(1), pages 151-188, January.
    6. Gian Luca Clementi & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2006. "A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(1), pages 229-265.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rampini, Adriano A. & Viswanathan, S., 2013. "Collateral and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 466-492.
    2. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Eva Ropero & Alessandro T. Villa, 2021. "Optimal financial contracting and the effects of firm's size," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 446-467, June.
    3. Li, Shuyun May, 2013. "Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 964-983.
    4. Shuyun May Li, 2009. "Optimal Lending Contracts with Long Run Borrowing Constraints," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1084, The University of Melbourne.
    5. S. Viswanathan & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Collateral, Financial Intermediation, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity," 2008 Meeting Papers 116, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Shuyun May Li, 2008. "Costly External Finance, Reallocation, and Aggregate Productivity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1044, The University of Melbourne.
    7. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.
    8. Maideu-Morera, Gerard, 2024. "Firm Size and Compensation Dynamics with Risk Aversion and Persistent Private Information," TSE Working Papers 24-1535, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2016. "Liquidity and Risk Management: Coordinating Investment and Compensation Policies," 2016 Meeting Papers 1703, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Shuyun May Li, 2009. "Optimal Lending Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Two-sided Limited Commitment or Impatient Entrepreneur," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1065, The University of Melbourne.
    11. Bernardo Morais, 2011. "Should I Stay or Should I Go: Investor Protection, Firm Selection and Aggregate Productivity," 2011 Meeting Papers 878, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
    13. Sakai, Koji & Uesugi, Iichiro & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2010. "Firm age and the evolution of borrowing costs: Evidence from Japanese small firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1970-1981, August.
    14. Vasco M. Carvalho & Basile Grassi, 2019. "Large Firm Dynamics and the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1375-1425, April.
    15. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Aysa Ipek Erdogan, 2023. "Drivers of SME Growth: Quantile Regression Evidence From Developing Countries," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(1), pages 21582440231, March.
    17. David Kohn & Fernando Leibovici & Michal Szkup, 2016. "Financial Frictions And New Exporter Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 453-486, May.
    18. Ales, Laurence & Maziero, Pricila & Yared, Pierre, 2014. "A theory of political and economic cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 224-251.
    19. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
    20. Cao, Dan & Lorenzoni, Guido & Walentin, Karl, 2019. "Financial frictions, investment, and Tobin’s q," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 105-122.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:18-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edstous.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.