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Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction

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Author Info
Lopomo, Giuseppe

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 36 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 219-240
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:2:p:219-240

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Riley, John G, 1988. "Ex Post Information in Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 409-29, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 1998. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 144-166, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Riley, John G., 1991. "Equilibria in open common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 101-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bernard Lebrun, 2006. "First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2006_5, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul D. Klemperer, 2007. "When are Auctions Best?," NBER Working Papers 13268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. repec:att:wimass:1920017r is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2003. "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1372, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Lixin Ye, 2004. "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1158-1158. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Auctions in which Losers Set the Price," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 845, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares, 2005. "Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly," Working Papers 0515, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2002. "On the Concentration of Allocations and Comparisons of Auctions in Large Economies," Working Papers 1146, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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