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Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities

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  • Sandro Brusco
  • Giuseppe Lopomo

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File URL: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers99/99-05Lopomo.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99-05.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:99-05

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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Cited by:
  1. Cramton Peter & Schwartz Jesse A, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, December.
  2. Damme, E.E.C. van & Börgers, T., 2003. "Auction Theory for Auction Design," Discussion Paper 2003-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C74-C96, March.
  5. Gian Albano & Fabrizio Germano & Stefano Lovo, 2006. "Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-8, April.
  6. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
  7. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.
  8. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, . "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  10. Gregory Crawford & Evan Kwerel & Jonathan Levy, 2008. "Economics at the FCC: 2007–2008," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 187-210, November.
  11. Leslie Marx, 2006. "Economics at the Federal Communications Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 349-368, December.

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